Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents∗
In many contractual relationships, consumers are allowed to terminate agreements at will. We study how removing commitment power from consumers affects equilibrium contracts and welfare when consumers have self-control problems. We show that removing commitment power is welfare improving when consumers are sufficiently dynamically inconsistent. Controlling for impatience, it is easier to sustai...
متن کاملOptimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent...
متن کاملMotivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach
In this paper we investigate the computational complexity of motivating time-inconsistent agents to complete long term projects. We resort to an elegant graph-theoretic model, introduced by Kleinberg and Oren [4], which consists of a task graph G with n vertices, including a source s and target t, and an agent that incrementally constructs a path from s to t in order to collect rewards. The twi...
متن کاملCostly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship
We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally enforced) and informal (self-enforcing) contracts...
متن کاملOptimal Long-Term Financial Contracting with Privately Observed Cash Flows
We characterize the optimal long-term financial contract in a setting in which a risk-neutral agent with limited capital seeks external financing for a project which pays stochastic cash flows over many periods. These cash flows are unobservable and unverifiable by outside investors. The agent can be induced to pay investors via the threat of the loss of control of the project. After solving fo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3176354