Long-Term Care Insurance and Intra-family Moral Hazard: Fixed vs Proportional Insurance Benefits

Budgetary Systems and Moral Hazard in National Health Insurance and Long-term Care Insurance

Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity in Unemployment Insurance

It is well known that higher unemployment bene…ts lead to longer unemployment durations. This result has been interpreted as evidence of “moral hazard”–a behavioral response to distorted marginal incentives to search. This paper shows that unemployment bene…ts also raise durations through a “liquidity”e¤ect for households who cannot smooth consumption perfectly. The empirical importance of the ...

Long-Term Care Insurance and the Family

This paper demonstrates that informal care by family members significantly weakens the demand for long-term care insurance. This result is largely driven by the fact that insurance does not cover informal care costs. To quantify the effect of informal care on insurance demand and evaluate potential welfare-improving policies, I develop and estimate a dynamic model of long-term care decisions be...

Family Spillovers of Long - term Care Insurance

We examine how long-term care insurance (LTCI) affects family outcomes expected to be sensitive to LTCI, including utilization of informal care and spillover effects on children. An instrumental variables approach allows us to address the endogeneity of LTCI coverage. LTCI coverage induces less informal caregiving, suggesting the presence of intra-family moral hazard. We also find that children...

Moral Hazard , Insurance , and Some

We consider a model of insurance and collusion. EÆcient risk sharing requires the consumer to get a monetary compensation in case of a loss. But this in turn implies consumer-provider collusion incentives to submit false claims to the insurer. We assume, however, that only some providers are collusive while some are honest, and determine the optimal contract specifying the treatment, the insura...