Long-term Capacity Adequacy in Electricity Markets: Reliability Contracts VS Capacity Obligations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Energy Studies Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0843-4379
DOI: 10.15173/esr.v16i2.514