Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions

Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions

1 This work was done while George Mailath and Larry Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowldeged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful discussions. This is a revision of Section 2 of Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [2]. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the Uni...

Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly

Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of two groups (or populations) of firms, the low cost firms and the high cost firms. The firms produce a homogeneous good. I study the finite population evolutionarily stable strategy defined by Schaffer (1988), and the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics based on imitation and experimentation of strategies by firms in each gr...

Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

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The Short and Long Run Causality between Agglomeration and Productivity

This study is to investigate the short- and long-run causal relationship between agglomeration (localization and urbanization) economies and labor productivity in the manufacturing sector of 28 Iranian provinces over an 11-year period, 2001–2011. Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method was used to estimate our long-run panel data model. The empirical findings suggested that localiz...

CARESS Working Paper #95-16 CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND LOCAL INTERACTIONS