Lone wolf theorem for one-sided matching problems with outside option

Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences

One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. I...

A One-sided Matching with Dynamic Preferences

In recent years, the problem of allocating indivisible resources to self-interested agents has generated an interesting, rich interplay at the interface of computer science, economics, and game theory. Most theoretical frameworks and empirical studies for resource allocation encompass a wide range of desirable economic properties such as efficiency, truthfulness, and fairness. In addition, a br...

Dancing With Wolves: Today's Lone Wolf Terrorists

The Least-Unpopularity-Factor and Least-Unpopularity-Margin Criteria for Matching Problems with One-Sided Preferences

Given a set of people, a set of positions available to them (e.g., houses or jobs), and each person’s preference ordering of the positions, how shall we assign the people to the positions? Since different matchings inevitably favor different people, it is not clear which matching(s) should be considered best overall; many different optimality criteria are possible. One is popularity: a matching...

Nontrivial Solutions for Nonlinear Problems with One Sided Resonance

We find nontrivial smooth solutions for nonlinear elliptic Dirichlet problems driven by the p-Laplacian (1 < p < ∞), when one sided resonance occurs at the principal spectral interval.