Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games.
It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have "prosocial preferences" that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influence...
متن کاملResistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lea...
متن کاملSustainability of common pool resources
Sustainability has become a key issue in managing natural resources together with growing concerns for capitalism, environmental and resource problems. We hypothesize that the ongoing modernization of competitive societies, which we refer to as "capitalism," affects human nature for utilizing common pool resources, thus compromising sustainability. To test this hypothesis, we design and impleme...
متن کاملPublic Goods Agreements with Other‐regarding Preferences
Stimulation of cooperation when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990's, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions ...
متن کاملRegulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources
The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1802872115