Localismo politico e globalizzazione

Politico - Economic Equilibrium Andeconomic

Elections , Capital Flows , and Politico Economic Equilibria

We study an open economy where a pro labor and a pro business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Poli...

WORKING PAPERS A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts

This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of intergenerational contracts, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over government spending. Embedding a repeated probabilistic voting setup in a standard OLG model with human capital accumulation, we find that the empowerment of elderly constituencies is key in order to enforce productive policies. The paper characterize...

Who Gains from Child Labor? A Politico-Economic Investigation

This paper develops a positive theory of the adoption of child labor restrictions (CLR). The key mechanism in our model is an interaction between parental decisions on family size and their preferences for CLR. While parents with few children have little to gain from child labor and are therefore likely to favor CLR, parents with many working children would be expected to oppose CLR. Fertility ...

A Politico-Economic Model of Public Expenditure and Income Taxation

We model the political process as consisting of voting on the issue considered salient, public expenditure, with a subsequent consensus over size of government and income taxation. We prove that for each majoritarian choice there is a unique consensus policy on progressivity and government size. We empirically validate the implication that the sign of the relationship between inequality and pro...