Local Taxation, Private-Public Consumption Complementarity, and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Number of Jurisdictions
Viewing local finances under the approach to private-public consumption complementarity, we conclude that foot voting and tax competition become extinct when the (capital) tax structure across jurisdictions is the one forging close ties between the burgher and his/her jurisdiction. Feeling the burgher attached to the local public goods offered and to the local business activity, prevents labor ...
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The paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and, thus, helps to tame Leviathan governments. However, this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government. In the case of benefit taxes, e.g. user charges, a Leviathan may be tam...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.49103