Lobbying for Science
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the com...
متن کاملCorporate Lobbying for Environmental Protection
Much of the time, firms lobby against environmental protection, but there are major exceptions to this rule. DuPont, the leading ozone polluter in the 1980s, lobbied for a complete ban of its product. In 2015, in the run up to the Paris Agreement, Europe's six largest oil and gas companies lobbied for a global carbon price. This kind of political support is often pivotal for governments trying ...
متن کاملA Comparison of Optimal Tariffs and Welfare under No Lobbying, Domestic Lobbying, and Domestic-foreign Lobbying
Whether and what type of the lobbying-induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic-foreign lobbying achieves the lowest tariff and may also realize the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our results suggest that the domestic-foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in t...
متن کاملLobbying for Power: A Structural Model of Lobbying in the Energy Sector∗
Firms systematically lobby the U.S. Congress to in uence policy-making. To what extent do lobbying expenditures a ect the probability that a policy is enacted? What are the private returns from lobbying expenditures? To answer these questions, I construct a novel dataset comprised of federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress (2007 2008). A...
متن کاملBribes , Lobbying , and Development
When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Science
سال: 1951
ISSN: 0036-8075,1095-9203
DOI: 10.1126/science.114.2963.3