Lobbying, corruption and political influence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Political institutions , lobbying and corruption
Although firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institu...
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We study lobbying with information in a setting where politicians are connected through a network describing information flows. There are two opposing lobby groups, who choose which politician to address. The decision depends on the ideological bias of politicians as well as the overall network structure. We show that there is an interplay between the strength of the network, as given by the in...
متن کاملCaps on Political Lobbying
The cost of political campaigns in the U.S. has risen substantially in recent years. For example, real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 (Steven D. Levitt [1995]). There are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful. First, increased spending means increased fund-raising, which may keep politicians from their legislative duti...
متن کاملCorruption and Political Competition
There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some strikin...
متن کاملCaps on Political Lobbying: Reply
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) [CG, hereafter] studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying expenditures. They showed that a cap may lead to (1) greater expected aggregate expenditure and (2) a less efficient allocation of a political prize. In their comment, Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein (2005) [KW, hereafter] show that if the cap is not rigid (i.e., its effect on the cost of lobbying ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9102-4