Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an inuence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discrimina...
متن کاملResearch Area Markets and Political Economy Research Unit Market Processes and Governance Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt Und Politische Ökonomie Abteilung Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discrimin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.722478