Lobbying and Lobbying Activity Tendencies in Lithuania 2000–2013

A Comparison of Optimal Tariffs and Welfare under No Lobbying, Domestic Lobbying, and Domestic-foreign Lobbying

Whether and what type of the lobbying-induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic-foreign lobbying achieves the lowest tariff and may also realize the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our results suggest that the domestic-foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in t...

Bribes , Lobbying , and Development

When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...

Fiscal federalism and lobbying

Article history: Received 18 April 2005 Received in revised form 20 March 2008 Accepted 7 May 2008 Available online 24 May 2008 Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account?We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (res...

Lobbying and Information in Politics

Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):1–31]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one...