Lobbying and democracy in Germany

Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy

This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen–candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by...

Consensus Democracy and Interjurisdictional Fiscal Solidarity in Germany

The paper discusses recent developments of German fiscal federalism—especially the Länderfinanzausgleich, i.e. Germany’s unique system of horizontal equalization. A ruling by the Constitutional Court has cracked the status quo, and the parties involved (federation and states) have begun a process of bargaining on a new equalization system. This process is assessed against the background of rece...

A Comparison of Optimal Tariffs and Welfare under No Lobbying, Domestic Lobbying, and Domestic-foreign Lobbying

Whether and what type of the lobbying-induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic-foreign lobbying achieves the lowest tariff and may also realize the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our results suggest that the domestic-foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in t...

Lobbying and Information in Politics

Bribes , Lobbying , and Development

When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...