Loan officer gender and loan repayment performance. Evidence from greenfield microfinance institutions in Cameroon <sup>1</sup>
نویسندگان
چکیده
We explore whether loan officer gender affects repayment performance in Cameroonian microfinance institutions (MFIs). After controlling for demand-side factors (borrower characteristics), lending methodology, contract terms, year, and industry fixed effects, we apply a pooled probit model to unique loan-level dataset including more than 7000 loans approved between 2007 2012 by two commercial MFIs. find that granted monitored male officers perform better those female under joint liability contracts are less likely fall into arrears. Our findings also show the advantage of over is confirmed only during bad times. Compared officers, seem intensify their monitoring efforts crisis period. The results robust after selection bias sensitive change measurement.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1467-8292', '1370-4788', '0770-8548']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12382