Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victor...
متن کاملLlull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins [BTT92]. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’...
متن کاملLlull and Copeland Voting Broadly Resist Bribery and Control
Control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins [BTT92]. An election system in which such an agent’s computational task is NP-hard is said to be resistant to the given type of control. The only election systems known to be resistant to all the standard control types are highly art...
متن کاملCopeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
متن کاملar X iv : 0 71 1 . 47 59 v 1 [ cs . G T ] 2 9 N ov 2 00 7 Copeland Voting Fully
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2697