Livermore hitches a ride on state lobbying efforts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Influence on the Demand for State Lobbying
The mobilization of interest groups is affected not only by social and economic “supply” factors but also by government-related “demand” factors as well. We add to a growing literature noting the impact on interest-group mobilization of government activity by examining how federal policy activity in an issue-area stimulates interest-group activity at the state level in the same issue-area. Empi...
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Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) [CG, hereafter] studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying expenditures. They showed that a cap may lead to (1) greater expected aggregate expenditure and (2) a less efficient allocation of a political prize. In their comment, Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein (2005) [KW, hereafter] show that if the cap is not rigid (i.e., its effect on the cost of lobbying ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/374753b0