Linear-Quadratic $N$-person and Mean-Field Games with Ergodic Cost

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چکیده

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Linear-Quadratic N-person and Mean-Field Games with Ergodic Cost

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

سال: 2014

ISSN: 0363-0129,1095-7138

DOI: 10.1137/140951795