Linear quadratic mean field games with a major player: The multi-scale approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mean field linear quadratic games
This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-zero. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game unde...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Automatica
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0005-1098
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2019.108774