Limited Liability, Strategic Default and Bargaining Power
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction
The literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement. We analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non-cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a tenant. In the sequential game where the landlord moves first and the tenant has limited liability, we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in wh...
متن کامل1 Interlinkage , Limited Liability and Strategic Interaction
* Subject to the usual disclaimer, the authors would like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. ABSTRACT: The literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement. We analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non-cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3682550