Limited Liability of Innkeepers under Statutory Regulations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information in tournaments under limited liability
The problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both situations, performance measures can be ranked if their likelihood ratio distribution fun...
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We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with potentially incomplete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability (that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract), she may have an incentive to take on excessive risk. With complete markets, the precise nature of the risk the agent may take on is a la...
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The literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement. We analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non-cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a tenant. In the sequential game where the landlord moves first and the tenant has limited liability, we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in wh...
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Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability, the principal may...
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We quantify the cost of limited liability rules in a traditional model of investment financing under moral hazard and risk aversion. Under limited liability, we show that external debt and the granting of absolute priority to debtholders are key (but not the unique) ingredients of the optimal financing package. Removing liability limits makes possible a superior contract that punishes the entre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register
سال: 1928
ISSN: 0749-9833
DOI: 10.2307/3307458