Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Computation Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1942-3454,1942-3462
DOI: 10.1145/2934309