Limit Optimal Trajectories in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Definable Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally subanalytic stochastic games. We prove that the Shapley operator of any definable stochastic game with separable transition and reward functions is definable in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2153-0785,2153-0793
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00333-z