منابع مشابه
Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
We compare the properties of several notions of perfectness within classes of compact, metric, and (possibly) discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of perfectness may fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium. These conditions a...
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The Betz theory expresses that no horizontal axis wind turbine can extract more than 16/27 (59.3%) of the kinetic energy of the wind. The factor 16/27 (0.593) is known as the Betz limit. Horizontal Axis wind turbine designers try to improve the power performance to reach the Betz limit. Modern operational wind turbines achieve at peak 75% to 80% of the Betz limit. In 1919, Albert Betz used an a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90118-3