Life Insurance Demand Under Health Shock Risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
“the effect of risk aversion on the demand for life insurance: the case of iranian life insurance market”
abstract: about 60% of total premium of insurance industry is pertained?to life policies in the world; while the life insurance total premium in iran is less than 6% of total premium in insurance industry in 2008 (sigma, no 3/2009). among the reasons that discourage the life insurance industry is the problem of adverse selection. adverse selection theory describes a situation where the inf...
15 صفحه اولInformation processing under imprecise risk with an insurance demand illustration
This paper deals with the impact of information on the decisions of an agent whose beliefs are imprecise and whose preferences are not in accordance with the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model. We assume that his one-shot preferences are representable by a Hurwicz criterion with pessimism–optimism index a. We moreover assume that in a sequential decision making situation the decision maker...
متن کاملa time-series analysis of the demand for life insurance in iran
با توجه به تجزیه و تحلیل داده ها ما دریافتیم که سطح درامد و تعداد نمایندگیها باتقاضای بیمه عمر رابطه مستقیم دارند و نرخ بهره و بار تکفل با تقاضای بیمه عمر رابطه عکس دارند
Financial Instability and Life Insurance Demand
The purpose of this research is to discuss Japanese financial instability and both private life insurance and public life insurance (Kampo) demand. At the same time, we also consider Kampo’s main role and what Kampo should be as an insurance service provider in the future. From empirically estimating private life insurance and Kampo demand functions using household-level data provided by the Po...
متن کاملRisk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt-Out.
This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some, but not all, individuals can opt out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are symmetrically informed about health-related risks, and that there can be adverse or advantageous selection when insureds ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Insurance
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-4367
DOI: 10.1111/jori.12149