Life insurance and genetic testing: is genetic information an exception?

The value of genetic information in the life insurance market

This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from a...

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance Market an Iranian Insurance Company

The presence of asymmetric information is an important source of efficiency loss for insurance companies and could reduce profitability. In this paper, we test the conditional independence of coverage choice and risk, where “conditional” means conditional on all variables observed by the insurer. We use two parametric methods: a pair of probits and a bivariate probit model. The data includes al...

Genetic testing and disability insurance: an alternative opinion.

As members of the Working Group on Genetic Testing in Disability Insurance, the authors of this alternative opinion describe their areas of disagreement with some of the conclusions in the paper written by Susan M. Wolf and Jeffrey P. Kahn.

Statement on Genetic Testing and Insurance

Life insurance and breast cancer risk assessment: adverse selection, genetic testing decisions, and discrimination.

Life insurance industry access to genetic information is controversial. Consumer groups argue that access will increase discrimination in life insurance premiums and discourage individuals from undergoing genetic testing that may provide health benefits. Conversely, life insurers argue that without access to risk information available to individuals, they face substantial financial risk from ad...