Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty
Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This activity level can be endogenized in any of several ways{ as whether to incur a xed cost of activity, as output choice, or as quality choice. Our model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the s...
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We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertaint...
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Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This simple model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the same features which make the Cournot model attractive. Unlike in a Cournot model with similar incomplete information, Bertrand pro ts always ...
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Bertrand’s model of oligopoly, which gives per$ectly competitive outcomes, assumes lhat: (1) there is competition overprices and (2) production follow dle reulizafion of demand. We show that both of ~heseassumption are required. Moreprecisely, consider a two-stage oligopoly game where,~rst, there is simultaneous produc~ion,and, second, ajierproduction levels are made public, there i~price compe...
متن کاملBertrand and Cournot competition under asymmetric costs: number of active firms in equilibrium
We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1331-677X,1848-9664
DOI: 10.1080/1331677x.2020.1844586