Liability of statutory organs in limited liability companies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Portfolio Delegation with Limited Liability
We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with potentially incomplete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability (that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract), she may have an incentive to take on excessive risk. With complete markets, the precise nature of the risk the agent may take on is a la...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1211-8516,1211-8516
DOI: 10.11118/actaun201159020121