LIABILITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ADMINISTRATORS

Portfolio Delegation with Limited Liability

We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with potentially incomplete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability (that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract), she may have an incentive to take on excessive risk. With complete markets, the precise nature of the risk the agent may take on is a la...

Law Enforcement; a Function of Criminal Liability or Civil Liability

Despite the fact that in investigations and legal writings enough consideration has been paid to the founding principles and rules governing civil and criminal liability as well as damages of crime, the legal or disciplinary responsibility accompanying these two types of legal responsibilities has not been taken seriously into account and the people involved it - in particular, the authorities ...

Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction

The literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement. We analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non-cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a tenant. In the sequential game where the landlord moves first and the tenant has limited liability, we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in wh...

Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and Taxes: A Comment on the Survival of Organizational Forms

Limited Liability and the Risk- Incentive Relationship

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability, the principal may...