Liability of financial regulators for bank failures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Amicus Curiae
سال: 2011
ISSN: 2048-481X,1461-2097
DOI: 10.14296/ac.v2004i52.1061