منابع مشابه
The Outbreak of Cholera in Mesopotamia and Syria in 1889, 1890, and 1891
any part of the Ottoman or Persian dominions, took everybody by surprise, and few would believe at first that the outbreak was really one of the dreaded Asiatic scourge. The rise of the Euphrates and Tigris in 1889 was insignificant. Navigation in the great canal of Shat-el-Hai, which connects the Tigris with the Euphrates, ceased in May, and the extensive marsh lying between Shatra and Nasriye...
متن کاملDam-Breach hydrology of the Johnstown flood of 1889–challenging the findings of the 1891 investigation report
In 1891 a report was published by an ASCE committee to investigate the cause of the Johnstown flood of 1889. They concluded that changes made to the dam by the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club did not cause the disaster because the embankment would have been overflowed and breached if the changes were not made. We dispute that conclusion based on hydraulic analyses of the dam as originally b...
متن کاملOtto Mangold (1891-1962)
Otto Mangold [5] was an early-twentieth-century embryologist who specialized in the development of amphibian embryos. A major emphasis of his research was refining the concept of the organizer [6], now referred to as embryonic induction [7]. He was born on 4 November 1891 in Auenstein, Germany, and came from what Viktor Hamburger [8], a colleague and personal acquaintance, described as ?peasant...
متن کاملEconomics University of Bonn Adenauerallee 24 - 42 D - 53113 Bonn
We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a là Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the opponents’ previous output. The dynamics of the decision rules induce a Markov chain. As expression of bound...
متن کاملBonn Econ Discussion Papers
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons inuence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer e¤ects, agents e¤orts are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. I solve for the optimal monetary i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quaderni d'italianistica
سال: 1984
ISSN: 2293-7382,0226-8043
DOI: 10.33137/q.i..v5i2.10967