منابع مشابه
Layoffs, Lemons and Temps∗
We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of labor demand with adverse selection. Firms learn the quality of newly hired workers after a period of employment. Adverse selection makes it costly to hire new workers and to release productive workers. As a result, firms hoard labor and under-react to labor demand shocks. The adverse selection problem also creates a market for temporary workers. In equ...
متن کاملLayoffs, Lemons, Race and Gender
Layoffs, Lemons, Race and Gender This paper expands on Gibbons and Katz (1991) by looking at how the difference in wage losses across plant closing and layoff varies with race and gender. We find that the differences between white males and the other groups are striking and complex. The lemons effect of layoff holds for white males as in Gibbons and Katz model, but not for the other three demog...
متن کاملLayoffs and lemons over the business cycle
This paper develops a simple model in which unemployment arises from a combination of selection and bad luck. During recessions, the proportion of workers who are laid off due to low productivity declines during recessions, diminishing the adverse signaling effect of an unemployment spell. Wage regressions estimated using the Displaced Workers Supplement support this basic prediction of the mod...
متن کاملImperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets
This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. We then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness...
متن کاملInformation and the market for lemons
This article revisits Akerlof’s (1970) classic adverse-selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the “buyer’s curse,” thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2048-7193,2048-7207
DOI: 10.1093/jpids/piy083