Legitimacy versus illegitimacy — transparency, integrity of financial markets and corporate governance: whither corruption?

Transparency and Corporate Governance∗

An objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transpa...

Conflicts of Interest Corporate Governance and Financial Markets

Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets

We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken i...

Financial Disclosure, Corporate Transparency, and Innovation

We explore the connection between the country-level financial disclosure environment and innovative investment. There is strong evidence a more transparent disclosure environment lowers the cost and increases the availability of external equity finance, which should, in turn, impact the real activities most dependent on such financing. Using a variety of proxies for disclosure and transparency ...

The Effects of Transparency of Financial Information and Board Composition on Forecast Accuracy of Corporate Earnings

The aim of the present research is to determine the effects of financial information transparency and composition of board of directors on forecast accuracy of corporate earnings in companies. A corporation's key for success is hidden in its optimal direction. So it can be claimed that the secret of the eternal reputation of popular corporations lies in their efficient board of directors. One o...