Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamics of Rule Revision and Strategy Revision in Legislative Games
Many legislative games of interest defy classical assumptions and techniques; they tend to be open-ended, with weakly defined objectives, and either noncompetitive or pseudo-competitive. We introduce a conceptual and mathematical framework for grappling with such systems. Simulation results are presented for basic specifications of the framework that exhibit a number of qualitative phenomena ov...
متن کاملVertical Learning: On Baker and Rodriguez's "Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny"
متن کامل
Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making
Interest groups often make their preferences known on cases before the U.S. Supreme Court via amicus curiae briefs. In evaluating the case and related arguments, we posit that judges take into account more than just the number of supporters for the liberal and conservative positions. Specifically, judges’ decisions may also reflect the relative power of the groups. We use network position to me...
متن کاملJudicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in Comparative Perspective
Versions of this article were presented at the 2000 Conference on the Scientific Study of Judicial Politics (Ohio State University), the 2001 Conference on Positive Theories of Constitutions and Constitutional Design (Mershon Center, Ohio State University), the 2001 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting (Chicago), the 2001 General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Rese...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: University of Pennsylvania Law Review
سال: 1958
ISSN: 0041-9907
DOI: 10.2307/3310406