Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration

Legislative bargaining with teams

We experimentally investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with two player teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions (MECs) significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins norm. Teams have significantly more proposer power, and come significantly closer to the SSPE prediction. This results from proposers c...

Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power∗

Many assemblies grant one or more of their members the right to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority—a veto right. In this paper, I analyze the consequences of veto power in an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous status quo policy. The division of the dollar among legislators is unchanged until the committee agrees on a new...

Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We sho...

Legislative Bargaining with Changing Political Power

This paper studies legislative negotiations between two parties whose political power changes over time. The model has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which becomes very tractable when parties can make offers frequently. This tractability facilitates studying how changes in political power affect implemented policies. An extension of the baseline model analyses how elections influence leg...