Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A dynamic Cournot duopoly model with different strategies
ess as: A ciety (20 and host s.2014.0 Abstract This paper analyzes the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly model with different strategies. We offer results on existence, stability and local bifurcations of the equilibrium points. The bifurcation diagrams and Lyapunov exponents of the model are presented to show that the model behaves chaotically with the variation in the parameters. The state variab...
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Consider a symmetric differentiated duopoly model in which firms have private market data about the uncertain demand. We analyze two types of duopoly information equilibrium, Cournot and Bertrand, which emerge, respectively, from quantity and price competition, and show that the incentives for information sharing and its welfare consequences depend crucially on the type of competition, the natu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00060-2