Learning to bid – an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Learning to Bid – An Experimental Study of Bid Function Adjustments in Auctions and Fair Division Games
We examine learning behavior in auctions and fair division games with independent private values under two di¤erent price rules, ...rst and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether learning is in‡uenced by the structural di¤erences between games. We ...nd that within the time horizon ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00123