Learning in Standard-Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Why are some contractual terms revised continuously while others stubbornly fixed? We offer an account of both change and stickiness in standard-form contracts. hypothesize that drafters (sellers) more likely to revise their standard when they have opportunity learn about the terms’ costs from experience. Consider a warranty. Offering warranty initial period will expose sellers claims malfunction by purchasers, allowing whether it is desirable going forward. When unable this manner, either because fail experiment or term question one where there no increased experience, such be relatively less frequently. While learning occur through various channels, we posit that, all else equal, carry experience frequently, whereas modalities do not contribute stagnation. Our results support hypothesis. Using large sample changes business consumer contracts over seven years, find than those not. These findings further illustrated supported interviews with in-house counsel. The suggest contract evolve time as experientially risks. analysis offers new accounts for use boilerplate, stickiness, has normative implications optimal design default rules product features (JEL codes: K12).
منابع مشابه
Contracts: Theory and Evidence
The information systems outsourcing market has seen rapid growth. Companies are increasingly choosing to outsource many of their information systems activities to services firms rather than sourcing them internally. This trend is inconsistent with the predictions of some of the published literature which point to the high costs of using an outside market. These articles, based on transaction co...
متن کاملRule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence
An experiment, consisting of two 15-period runs with 5 = 5 games, was designed w Ž .x to test Stahl’s International Journal of Game Theory 28, 111]13
متن کاملStandardization of Standard-form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreeme...
متن کاملStandardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreeme...
متن کاملDiscretion in Executive Incentive Contracts: Theory and Evidence
We examine the role of discretion in executive incentive contracts, and explore the trade-offs firms face in choosing among imperfect objective measures of individual performance, more-accurate but non-verifiable subjective measures, and overly broad objective measures of company-wide performance that includes the performance of all agents in the firm. We generate implications and test the mode...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Legal Analysis
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1946-5319', '2161-7201']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laad001