Learning in Repeated Auctions

Online learning in repeated auctions

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good’s value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochas...

1 Supplier Learning in Repeated Online Procurement Auctions

1. Introduction Repetition is the key aspect of online procurement auctions as they are often conducted yearly or quarterly or even daily (Elmaghraby 2006; Pinker and et al. 2003). Yet it remains unknown (1) what the suppliers' incentives are for repeatedly participating in reverse auctions, especially for those non-winning suppliers (e.g. Jap 2002); (2) In business practice, whether suppliers ...

Information Transmission in Repeated Auctions

In this paper we consider repeated first price auctions where two identical items are sold sequentially to two bidders who are interested in both items. In this framework information transmission is of great importance. In the course of an auction, information about the bidders’ values become available as identity of the winner and/or bids are revealed. The aim of the paper is to study how diff...

Tacit collusion in repeated auctions

This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg at al. shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if pl...

Repeated Procurement Auctions