Leading With(Out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information

Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment.

This paper experimentally examines how information affects behavior in a threshold public goods game. Three treatments investigate how subjects react to varying amounts of information about the contribution behavior of other group members. Results suggest that revealing anonymous information about others' contributions leads to a significant decrease in contributions and an increase in the vari...

Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are conditional cooperators.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment

We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the a...

Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes. JEL Classification: A...