Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games

Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games

The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation

It is commonly alleged that a substantial proportion of lawsuits are frivolous and are filed only for their nuisance value. This paper models settlement bargaining in the presence of frivolous suits as a game of asymmetric information, where the plaintiff knows the true merits of his claim, and the defendant does not, apart from any inferences he can draw from the fact of suit. When there is fr...

A Frivolous Lawsuit May Destroy the Career of a Professional: Is There No Remedy?

Optimal use of information in litigation: should regulatory information be withheld to deter frivolous suits?

We examine the value of incorporating regulatory information into the court liability decision and making it publicly available, when the causality of harm is uncertain. Public access to regulatory information, coupled with its use in a liability decision, not only improves the accuracy of court adjudication but also guides victims to more informed decisions about their lawsuits, when victims' ...

Directors’ Insurance and the Expected Cost of Frivolous Litigation when Cross‐Listing into the U.S

We study the expected liability cost of cross‐listing into the United States by examining the change in the structure of a Canadian firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract (D&O insurance) before and after cross‐listing. All else being equal, we show that neither the likelihood of having insurance nor the D&O liability insurance coverage change following cross‐list...