Large Scale Learning of Agent Rationality in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-Stationary Policy Learning in 2-Player Zero Sum Games
A key challenge in multiagent environments is the construction of agents that are able to learn while acting in the presence of other agents that are simultaneously learning and adapting. These domains require on-line learning methods without the benefit of repeated training examples, as well as the ability to adapt to the evolving behavior of other agents in the environment. The difficulty is ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2374-3468,2159-5399
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33016104