منابع مشابه
Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games
Ž . Ž E. J. Green 1980, J. Econ. Theory 22, 155 182 and H. Sabourian 1990, J. . Econ. Theory 51, 92 110 studied repeated games where a player’s payoff depends on his actions and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and show that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend these results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymo...
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This thesis studies a class of problems where rational agents can make suboptimal decisions by ignoring a side effect that each individual action brings to bear on the common good. It is generally believed that a mutually desirable strategy can be enforced as a stable outcome for rational agents if the imminent threat exists that any deviator from the strategy will be punished. This thesis expa...
متن کاملRepeated Games
I Basic Results on Normal Form Games 3 I.1 The Minmax Theorem 4 I.1.a Definitions and Notations 4 I.1.b A Basic Theorem 5 I.1.c Convexity 6 I.1.d Mixed Strategies 6 I.1.e Note on the Separation Theorem 9 Exercises 10 I.2 Complements to the Minmax Theorem 15 I.2.a The Topology on S 16 I.2.b Lack of Continuity: Regularization 16 I.2.c Lack of Compactness: Approximation 19 I.2.d Measurability: Sym...
متن کاملRepeated games
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can be sustained in an equilibrium. This fact, known as the folk theorem, is explained under various information structures. This entry also compa...
متن کاملRepeated Games
for every path a. The corresponding one-shot or stage game is denoted by G = ( {Ai}i=1, { fi}i=1 ) . The usual interpretation is that Ai is a set of pure actions.1 The set of feasible payoff vectors of the stage game G is given by the set F ≡ {p ∈ Rn| f (a) = p for some a ∈ A}. Let F∗ be the convex hull of the set of feasible payoffs. It should be clear that any normalized payoff in the repeate...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0826