Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Large Fluctuations and Fixation in Evolutionary Games
Abstract. We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the entire populati...
متن کاملAbstract Submitted for the MAR11 Meeting of The American Physical Society Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
Submitted for the MAR11 Meeting of The American Physical Society Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games MICHAEL ASSAF, MAURO MOBILIA — One of the most striking effects of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. In this work we use a semi-classical theory to study fixation in evolutionary games under non-v...
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We review stochastic evolutionary game theory from a perspective that starts in the very general regression methods of population genetics, and introduces games as a powerful yet flexible framework to unpack the “black box” of development, which generates frequency-dependent fitness maps and which may also structure the transmission process. This approach to evolutionary game theory retains the...
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متن کاملFixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1742-5468
DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2010/09/p09009