Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Minimum Wage in Competitive Labor Markets∗
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market. Introducing a minimum wage is desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers. This result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers. In that context, a minimum wage effectively rations low skilled labor which is subsidized by t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Labor Economics
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0734-306X,1537-5307
DOI: 10.1086/298064