منابع مشابه
Bounded Rationality in Repeated Games∗
Models of bounded rationality often lead to sharper predictions about real world outcomes than their full rationality counterparts. Full rationality in repeated interactions allows a plethora of equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, I examine the effect of bounded rationality in infinitely repeated games. In particular, does the introduction of boundedly rational agents lead to a smaller set of ...
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The analysis of dynamic games hinges on assumptions about players’ actions and beliefs at information sets that are not actually reached during game play, and that players themselves do not expect to reach. However, it is not obvious how to elicit intended actions and conditional beliefs at such information sets. Hence, key concepts such as sequential rationality, backward induction, and forwar...
متن کاملBusiness Games, Rationality and Control Logistics
This paper presentsthe research project “Business Games as Cultural Techniques. Transforming Knowledge and Steering Actions at the Interface between Economy, Computer Sciences and Mediality”. 1 The main idea of the project is to reflect a development that is central in the history of the computer as well as games between 1950 and 1970, when both these cultural techniques were at the centre of g...
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In generic perfect-information games the unique Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) outcome is identical to the one predicted by several rationalizability notions, like Extensive-Form Rationalizability (EFR), the Backward Dominance Procedure (BDP), and Extensive-Form Rationalizability of the Agent form (AEFR). We show that, in contrast, within the general class of perfect information games all th...
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Models in the classical theory of games and in neoclassical economics normally assume rationality in the sense that agents have compete and transitive preferences. The paper labels this fundamental rationality and distinguishs two other sorts of rationality pertinent to the study of strategic interaction: individual economic rationality (IER) and effective rationality. IER is, we observe, chara...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University (Philosophical science)
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2310-7227
DOI: 10.18384/2310-7227-2017-1-15-27