Labor Market Rigidities and the Political Economy of Trade Protection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Positive Economics of Labor Market Rigidities and Investor Protection
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a substantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more divided the workfor...
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Much has been written about institutional differences between European and North American labor markets, and about their role in determining the large and persistent differences between the unemployment rates in Europe and US over the last fifteen-twenty years. The objective of this paper is to answer the question: why have these differences in labor market flexibility emerged and why do they p...
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15 صفحه اولThe political economy of labor subsidies
We explore a political-economy model of labor subsidies, extending Meltzer and Richard’s median-voter model to a dynamic setting. We explore only one source of heterogeneity: initial wealth. As a consequence, given an operative wealth effect, poorer agents work harder, and if the agent with median wealth is poorer than average, a politico-economic equilibrium will feature a subsidy to labor. Th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.509202