Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Abstract In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false there could have been unicorns, or more properly, “no counterfactual situation properly describable as one in which would unicorns.” He adds he holds similarly ‘one cannot say of any possible person Sherlock Holmes, had existed.” notes “cryptic brevity” these remarks refers a forthcoming work for elaborations—the being, course, John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming does at end , natural read this discussion drawing out consequences Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture proper names kinds. fact, so much suggested by himself. The question thus arises: can contentious claims quoted from be defended independently rejection descriptivism? I shall argue that, appears Lectures, they be.