Kripke on contingent a priori truths.

Superfi cially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths

In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superfi cially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness ...

Contingent A Priori Knowledge

I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary. The discussion...

A Defense of Contingent Logical Truths∗

A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M , false at some world of M . We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically pro...

Singular Thought and the Contingent A Priori

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. What would a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature be like? In spite of extensive discussion of the issue sin ce it was brought to the attention of the philosophical cornmunity in the late f...

The Standard Metre: Has It Anything to Do With The Contingent A Priori