Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality
نویسندگان
چکیده
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 105, Issue 2 p. 476-483 BOOK SYMPOSIUM Kolors Without Colors, Representation Intentionality Angela Mendelovici, Corresponding Author Mendelovici [email protected] [email protected] Western University Correspondence University. Email: [email protected], [email protected] for more papers by this authorDavid Bourget, David Bourget UniversitySearch author First published: 31 December 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12934Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare text full-text accessPlease review our Terms Conditions of Use check box below share version article.I have read accept Wiley Online Library UseShareable LinkUse link a article with your friends colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume105, Issue2September 2022Pages RelatedInformation
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0031-8205', '1933-1592']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12934