Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism

Transplantation is the preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease; deceaseddonor and live-donor kidneys are the two sources for transplantation, and these sources are utilized via two different programs. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patient-donor couples, for each of whom transplantation from donor to intended recipient is not...

An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism

We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement over a recent upper bound of 2 [Ashlagi e...

Kidney Exchange

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made ...

Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted

What ’ s Wrong with Info - Gap ? An Operations Research Perspective ∗

Info-Gap is purported to be a new theory for decision-making under severe uncertainty. Its claim to fame is that it is non-probabilistic in nature and thus offers an alternative to all current theories for decision-making under uncertainty. In this essay I examine this theory from an Operations Research point of view. I show that: · Info-Gap is neither new nor radically different from current d...